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PREFACE
This year's Annual Report from the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel has been divid<:d into two parts. The first part, dated
February 5, 1975, covered the Apollo Soyuz Test Project. This
part, Part II, covers the Panel's efforts on the Space Shuttle
program.
The Panel has been conducting reviews of the many aspects of
the Shuttle since September 1973 and considers this year's
Shuttle report to be the second in a continuing series of
reports. Reviews to date indicate that NASA is proceeding in
a reasonable manner to develop a technical basis for confidence
in crew safety. This judgement is based upon confidence in
(1) the review system which evaluates the adequacy of mission
requirements and whether the design approach meets them, (1) the
suitability of the test program to qualify Shuttle hardware/soft-
ware, (3) the assessment of hazards and their resolution, and
(4) the development process for subsystems critical to crew
safety.
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1.1 Objective
The objective of the Panel's review of the Space Shuttle Program
has been to evaluate whether the program is proceeding through a
reasonable process to develop a responsible level of crew safety.
Confidence in crew safety implies confidence in such areas as:
(a) NASA ac.d contractor management systems, including
policies, practices and procedures for the development of critical
systems, subsystems and integr "i:i,on of the program elements.
(b) Technical development status of critical systems,
subsystems and interfaces.
(c) Test program to qualify Space Shuttle elements (Or-
biter, External Tank, Main Engines, Solid Rocket Booster, Ground
Support Facilities).
(d) Identification and resolution of hazards.
(e) Mission operations and contingency planning.
1.2 Panel Activities
Since its last report the Panel has held detailed discussions
with the contractors for the Orbiter, Space Shuttle Main Engines,
and External Tank as well as with subcontractors for such critical
subsystems as the Orbiter Thermal Protection Subsystems and the Main
Engine Controller. We have had repeated discussions with the Shuttle
Program and Element Project Managers at the NASA Centers. In addition,
the Panel has physically examined the available Shuttle hardware,
fabrication and assembly facilities and test areas.
A summary of the agenda for these fact- finding activities is
provided in Attachment 1. The Panel also had a great deal of support-
ing documentation made available to them as required.
In addition to the on-site activities mentioned above, the Panel
has from time-to-time requested additional information to update or
clarify specific individual interests. An example of this material
is presented in Attachment 2.
2.0 OBSERVATIONS
2.1 Management
In general the Panel found that the organizations and management
systems implemented by NASA and its contractors for each of the
Shuttle elements are adequate and appropriate for the current stage
of the development program. Of particular note were significant
changes in management of the Main Engine project and its critical
Controller. These changes appear to have strengthened these management
systems.
Since the Shuttle is currently in the development phase, there
are a number of technical management challenges to be met and resolved.
Other.: will no doubt arise as the program evolves towards the
operational phase.
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An immediate need is to strengthen the Shuttle integration
function, particularll,, within NASA and to assure for the effective
cunduc:t of the "check and balance" role necessary to successful
systems integration. Examples are the performance/cost,/schedule
tradeoff stc—° CS and the planning of element and integrated test
programs. The current management system for Avionics hardware
and software, particularly on the Orbiter vehicle, should be reviewed
by senior program management to assure that capability is available
to deal with the complexities of Shuttle avionics. Tile current in-
tegration effort appears to be effective in the critical areas of defi-
nition, documentation, and control of hardware interfaces whereas
organization and management interfaces may require further attention.
The numerous Shuttle Pancls and Working Groups, established to
bring all the available technical talent to bear on the day-to-day
design and development problems, appears to be effective in support-
ing NASA and contractor technical decisions and review requirements.
The Panel feels a strong audit system is needed to check on day-
to-day operations as well as a system for providing program management
the opportunity to review risk assessment in a timely manner. Safety
data must be made available early enough to be considered in the de-
sign and test decisions.
2.2. Shuttle Program Elements
2.2.1 Orbiter
3
Although the orbiter generally is proceeding in a satisfactory
manner, certain critical areas have yet to be baselined. Among these
are the Thermal Protection Subsystem, Avionics System, and External
Doors which must be reviewed in the very near future.
Manufacturing procedures appear comparable to those observed
on prior spacecraft production. The Panel has not visited subcon-
tractors but there is a continuing need to monitor them.
Obviously, there are many areas that we have reviewed and about
which we could comment; however, we have decided to identify a few
areas most critical to achieving a high order of crew safety. Changes
in the design of the Thermal Protection Subsystem to use a "prepared"
NOMEX felt on large areas of the Orbiter upper fuselage in lieu of thin
tiles indicate a reduced hazard in this critical subsystem. In those
areas where tiles and reinforced carbon-carbon are used, the challenge
now appears to be installing and inspecting; them before each mission
rather than in the production of the tiles and nose caps. Installation
and inspection problems as to tile-to-tile steps Lind gaps are expected
in meeting individual and multiple tile tolerance requirements. De-
fining the inspection methods to assure tile internal inte g rity is
currently under study. Test programs on the Thermal Protection Sub-
system in high energy thermal and acoustic-vibration environments are
continuing.
Many door mechanisms are single failure points. The recent re-
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duction in the number of doors enhances the basis for confidence in
crew safety. The payload doors, including radiators and operating
mechanisms, still require further attention. In the light of the
Skylab Rem ,iau Board's recommendations, doors should be treated as
operating mechanisms rather than struct,re.
Development of practical thermal seals in and around moveable
aerodynamic surfaces and doors to prevent high heat loads on internal
structure and oper ting hardware during entry present a design and
test challenge.
The dynamics of Orbiter separation from the External Tank are
complex. A major concern is the design and fabrication of fittings
and a command system that will operate in a precisely timed sequence.
11iis will be necessary to avoid any vehicle instabilities or debris
impacting the Orbiter.
The Panel suggests that management review once again the follow-
ing areas to assure there is an adequate basis for confidence in
crew safety:
(a) The use of single actuators on the Orbiter elevons.
(b) Decision to use free fall deployment of the nose and
main landing gear immediately prior to runway touchdown.
(c) The realism of those Reference Missions 1 and 3 re-
quirements which affect safety because they are drivers on vehicle
design.
2.2.2 Space Shuttle Main Engine * (S Ir
The Integrated Subsystems Test Bed engine moved through assembly
ahead of a-hedule and the manufacturing personnel at Rocketdyne
Division of the Rockwell International Corporation now have a better
understanding of what will be required to produce these complex
engines. The materials for the critical pests of combustion devices,
turbomachinery and heat exchangers and c , mplexity of welds on engine
assemblies present potential problems with hydrogen embrittlement.
The test firing program will provide needed data on the ability to
survive repeated firings at pressures and heat rates not previously
experienced.
Analysis indicated that the Space Shuttle may be subject to POGO
(structural oscillations) not unlike those experienced by the Saturn V
launch vehicles on the Apollo and Skylab programs. A POGO suppressor
has been baselined and extensive tests coupled with analysis is cur-
rently underway. This requires a closely integrated NASA-Industry
team effort.
Experience during the past year with the Controller confirms
that the technology of plated wire cores is at the state-of-the-art
and there would be many problems to be resolved by a trial and error
approach.
Program Management's choice of an improved hydraulic fluid not
only reduced the fire hazard but improved performance. There have
been no major problems or additional costs associated with this change.
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2.2.3 Sold Rocket Booster
The solid rocket motor is ba p ically within th current state-of-
the-art of technology and design and fabrication of early units in
underway. MSFC, as the Boost.. Project Manager, indicates the de-
sign and manufacturing of the motor case and propellant are up to
expectations. The Panel's interest in the safety of a reuseable
booster system is not because of a feeling that the system is inher-
ently unsafe but because some of the inherent penalties of a reusable
system, i.e. greater weight and complexity, may well be drivers that
affect ".her parts of the system and result in an overall more complex
oyxtem with a sotw.what lower safety Factor,
The Panel in its review has been impressed by the effort that
has gone into implementing the reuseable conc-pt.
The areas requiring continuing management attention include:
(a) Design of the remaining components of the SRB assembly,
e.g., separation motors, avionics and parachutes.
(b) Reliability of the gimbaling mechanism (thrust vector
control).
(c) Reliability of the avionics] subsystem.
(d) Recovery, inspection and refurbishment procedures re-
lated to their ability to provide confidence in the safe reuse of
the booster. 'Ibis includes the wisdom of reusing electrical circuitry
and connectors in signal and control circuits that have been repeatedly
7
immersed in salt water.
(a) Parachute development and proof testing.
(f) Hazards to personnel involved in the water recovery
of the booster and parachutes.
(g) Protection of the critical structural members against
stress corrosion fractures.
2.2.4 External Tank
The External Tank is the mayor element in the Space Shutt.e
system that is expendable. The Panel's interest focused on the dis-
posal problems and on any hazards to the basic Orbiter vehicle.
The External Tank must he m!de to tumble after separation to
assure a predictable reentry footprint. This requirement has gen-
erated a set of ground rules for an acceptable disposal system and
at the same time also requires:
(a) Creation of a tank tumbling motion within a specified
ten to fifty degrees per second.
(b) Prevention of premature tank rupture.
(c) Prevention of recohLaZt with the Orbiter after separation.
The disposal system selected will not only have to meet the technical
ground rules but also the coat and weight constraints.
insulation material used on the external surface of the tank,
as well as its configuration, is of significance in that outgassing
and ablative products could adversely affect the orbiter's 'Thermal
1
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Protection Subsystem properties. Formation of ice/frost on the tank
and fittings could present a hazard to the Orbiter during launch.
A potential hazard results from taflon insulated wire routed
through the liquid oxygen tank to various tank sensors. A special
set of tests and analyses are being run under so-called "worst case
conditions" to determine the risk in-iolved. The Panel has requested
that other methods or materials be investigated to see what other
possibilities are available regardless of the outcome of the above
mentioned teat and analysis program.
2.2.5 Ground Facilities
The launch and landing aspects of the Shuttle Program were
recently reviewed by the Panel at KSC, and are ao extension of the
operations' reviews conducted earlier. KSC's role on the Apollo and
Skylab programs has provided excellent insight into the requirements
for Shuttle facilities and ground support equipment. Trade-offs
between costs and safety for ground support equipment require con-
tinuing management attention. The Panel will also continue to
monitor these trade-offs.
2.2.6 Test Program
The Panel's questiuns fall mainly in the area of the proposed
flight test program, i.e., the Approach and Landing Test and the
first six developmental orbital flights. The Approach and Landing
Test program may include as many as eleven low altitude flights
9
launched from the Boeing 747 carrier aircraft modified for this pur-
pose. During such flights there are separation effects to consider
that may affect crew safety. Shuttle elements will be tested to-
gether for the first time during the first vertical flight and as
a result additional hazards may be revealed. Therefore, as the flight
test planning evolves, management will need to give priority atten-
tion to:
(a) The risk versus the data obtained in the Approach
and Landing Test.
(b) Role of the crew in the control loop during the landing
phase.
(c) Analyses procedures and training for contingencies
including abort, ditching and landing accidents, including the impact
on design requirements.
(d) Proper role for range safety.
(e) Development of an integrated hazard analysis of the
first flight that would give management a comprehensive profile of
the risks and the alternatives.
The Ground Test Program As presented to the Panel appears to
meet the qualification/validation requirements of the individual
elements and the total integrated system. Continued study of the
ground test program and its relationship to the flight test program
is necessary to assure an orderly and timely approach to total
10
system verification.
2.2.7 Range Safety
The Panel has not reviewed the impact of the range destruct
system buL feels that its interface with the Booster or Orbiter
systems .,,ust be spelled out because it can well become a part of
the software as well as the hardware system. Such questions as
when and how does it override the computer and manual control is
an important factor in planning and design.
3.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1 Generally, the management system is adequate for the current
state of development.
3.1.1 Systems integration management needs to strengthen its
"check and balance" capability.
3.1.2 The management system for avionic hardware and software
should be reviewed by senior program management to assure it is
adequate for the Lndi,cated compler,ity of the program.
3.1.3 It is important that senior program management review both
the scope and results of safety analyses to reinforce early reso-
lution of risks. Similarly, attention should also be given to the
scope and results of technical management audits to assure that
such systems as described to the Panel are being applied properly.
Two examples are Configuration Management and Material Control.
3.2 The development of the Orbiter system is proceeding as
scheduled. Manufacturing procedures appear comparable to those
used on prior spacecraft programs.
3.2.1 The design and quality control for the doors, Thermal
Protection System penetrations and thermal seals should bo closely
monitored by management to assure that the reliability necessary
to satisfy safety will be achieved.
3.2.2 The procedures, instructions and training requirements for
installation and quality control of the Thermal Protection System
12
components should be reviewed by program management to assure the
aero/thermodynamic requirements are met.
3.2.3 Free fall deployment of landing gear may introduce safety
problems. Therefore the use of a positive system for rapid
extension of Lin(2- • gear should be considered.
3.3 The major challenges of significance for crew safety on the
Space Shuttle Main Engine are materials behavior under severe
environments, weld integrity, POGO suppresion and engine Controller
performance and reliability. Therefore the results of the test
program will be critical to developing confidence in these areas.
3.4 The major challenges on the External Tank of safety significance
are thermal insulation, ice formation, the use of teflon electrical
wire insulation in the liquid oxygen tank and provisions for control
of reentry.
3.5 The Solid Rocket Booster is in an early stage of development.
Critical areas must be monitored closely for the earliest possible
detection and resolution of problems to assure that trade-offs pro-
vide for the maximum Shuttle system safety. Such areas include
recovery and re-use of the booster.
3.6 The program in assuring the cost effectiveness of its re-
quirements for ground suppoct equipment needs to assure safety
receives appropriate attention.
3.7 The program is in the period of defining the detailed
requirements and plans for major development and flight testing.
13
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Plans for ground testing appear adequate. Safety-related testing
should be monitored to insure it is carried through as planned.
The interactions between the Orbiter, External Tank and Solid
Rocket Booster, including separation ,lynamics are complex. Analyses
based on ground testing should be thorough enough to maximize
confidence in safe development flights.
3.7.1 More information is needed on the risks of Approach and
Landing Testing in comparison with the value of information which
would be obtained in such flights.
3.7.2 The role of man-in -the-loop, especially dt.:ing landing,
rollout and braking, needs re-examinatio.t as the program reaches
the point where avionics' capability and limitations are better known.
3 7.3 Contingency analyses especially for aborts, ditching, landing
accidents, and range safety should be completed early enough to assure
design solution rather than operational work-arounds.
c^
w
A aw
.0
z
u
co
a^i
U
N
~
a 4u
c^
LI ^ w ^
w
w
I .a ^ ^" ^ y^w w
n
y
QN O
[H
JJ
co
N C
C:
N
0)
dl v1
W
a
Aj
C.
a
^4
r-4
" o
_
sr a
d a^i a u u >
to (D
u ga a 4 r a s ; ac cooz
cn
>
y a 3 V u d
w 4 a
m 0 w tai
y
yd
to
ro
41
a a s1 •14 W a •rl 140. o a•r4 ad a N$4	 a ^ 14 u•ri co .,4 {al m
Nl+
OD
'''
u co 60 m aH a m •r-1 y.l	 a r-r
caD U
^, w la+ 0o H.^ a ro ua ucn 0
bd r, e0 a a r-4H ^ -cc w q	 a"n
r. P u H u
.r
L' H a C a '^ u a F
-4 ^+ H 1.4 d abo to.a p a i In
a oD
1-+ ^+ ' 4 a {d
`	
En w w a u CL a w
N
a ^-a+
Ea }a.^^ tr a a a .0
F^r
cn W
Q •r4 b0 •^ a W .4 a 4
•r
L L	 y
N 1+ x .0 1+ ? C >+ G O?.0	 cn a N x U cnO a w cn ^n o cn cn o v^ Q ,a t cn cn
r`
rn
rn ,^^	 n
-4 	 CrN
 1\	 n	 Ir1
	 ^n
1	 r-i	 V1	 O\	 r-4	 ON
V1	 N	 w	 f\	 1	 V1	 1-4
m
H	 ^7	 r-1	 N	 1+	 1.4	 00 	
/-+
	
r-1	 ^D	 1	 N	 a	 1	 w
' 	 c i
	
r-I
	A	 y,d	 'Oj
	
v'	 mil	 .D
q	 .n	
a	 y7	 i 1	 0	 -CQ	 .+
h w
	 ti d
	 o
15
I
MSFC RESPONSE TO ACTION ITEMS FROM THE PANEL'S
INSPECTION TRIP OF APRIL 7-8.
P^JOWTIQAj `QL
r*^
^ ^^rs•19h6
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
v	 !	 GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER
MARSHALL SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, ALAIAMA 35811
REPLY TO avr,
ATTN Of. .SAO I
TO:	 NASA Headquarters
Attn: APA/Mr. Howard Nason
FROM:	 SA01 /Robert E. Lindstrom
SUBJECT: Action Items/Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel Visit, April 7 and 8, 1975
As discussed during the April 8 wrap-up Ression and in accordance
with your correspondence of May 23, 1975, this memorandum is
being forwarded to close certain actions as well as provide projected
response dates on the remaining actions recorded during the subject
visit. We are also addressing several additional actions provided
to us by Dr. Mrazek in early May and documented by your May 23
correspondence.
We have provided briefings to Dr. Mrazek on the below items and
believe these actions to be closed:
F..' :rnal Tank anti-geysering test program.
• MSFC sonic boom activities in support of JSC and RI
integration efforts.
• Acoustic, vibration, and thermal load data included on
element Interface Control Documents.
• Economics supporting recovery and reuse of Solid Rocket
Booster.
9 Solid Rocket Motor bi-propellant activities.
17
2We will follow-up on the briefing provided to Dr. Mrazek on SRB
recovery System with a written response to the Panel by June 16
on:
• Possibility of premature actuation of the SRB Recovery
System and the effects of such an actuation.
• Quality control efforts planned for the SRB Recovery System
based on prior Air Force drone recovery system experience.
Enclosures I through 10 address our responses to action items on:
• FMEA Critical Items List
9 Secondary Structural. Items
• Hazard Analysis Status
• 7075-T6 Material
• Teflon Insulated Wire
• Material Management System
• ET Lightning Protection
• Freezing /Breakoff of Condensation -- Damage to Orbiter TPS
• SSME Heat Exchanger Leakage Limits
• SSME Lightning Protection
e Utilization of Teflon Balls in POGO Suppressor Unit
t	 As you can note from our responses, several of these actions are
still in the analysis and coordination phase with JSC. Further data
will be supplied to the Panel upon completion of this phase. Also
at this time, we are still in the process of addressing the differences
between MSFC's and JSC's production hardware component acceptance
test vibration requirements. We should be in a position to provide
this response to the Panel on June 16.
1R
3While Mr. Praktish was here for the ASTP pre-FRR, we discussed
with him the deferment of the below items to more appropriate groups
for addressing the Panel's concerns:
• SSME Critical Failure Periods during the Ascent/Actions
to alleviate resulting problems (JSC/RI).
• Safety problems associated with SRB retrieval at sea (KSC).
As we discussed during your visit to MSFC, the question of critical
SSME failure periods relate to vehicle control problems. While
we are participating ve ry closely with JSC in this area from vehicle
structural limits, etc. , the critical time periods are mission/wind
dependent and this area should be addressed by JSC. Also, KSC
is carrying out the planning and development activities associated
with the SRB retrieval activity.
As we discussed with Mr. Praktish, we will stand ready to respond
to any questions that might arise on the attached responses And will
work toward having all of the actions closed by June 16. We appre-
ciated the opportunity to review our project elements status and
activities with you and the Panel and will look forward to further
discussions with you and the Panel members as we progress through
the Shuttle program.
14J2
4-:7M
Robert E. Lindstrom
anager, Shuttle Projects Office
10 Enclosures
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Aerospace Safety Advierry Panel
FMEA/Critical Items List
Attached are copies of the Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA /
Critical Items Lists (CIL) for the Space Shuttle Main Engine, External
Tank, and Solid Rocket Booster. [Copies available in Panel office. 1 It
should be noted that the FMEA/CIL enclosures are preliminary issues
originally released at the Preliminary Design Review, except for the
SSME which was updated November 1974, and as such, they have not
yet been accepted by MSFC as a baseline list of critical hardware.
The lists are being continuously updated as the design becomes more
mature, and it is expected that they will be reduced significantly in
the future. Also, MSFC has an effort in progress to evaluate these
FMEA/CILs, and to assure that all critical failure modes are identified
and minimized by elimination through design approaches or by redundancy.
Final acceptance of the list will occur in conjunction with the baselining
of the design at Critical Design Review.
5econdar S^ tructural Items
Relative to the requirements that we a-^e utilizing to assure that
proper FMEA review is liven to secondary structural items to account
for items similar to the Skylab meteoroid shield, a number of actions
should be recognized. As you are aware, special attention is given
Enclosure l
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2to structures as well as other passive components such as wiring and
tubing during the initial design and test phasm This attention consists
of a stress analysis which is analogous to a single failure mode effects
analysis to assure that the passive components will withstand all
predicted stresses with a reasonable safety margin. For passive cornpon,
which are of a new design, the stress analysis is not considered adequate•
and environmental tests are initiated to verify the strength and reliability
of such members. Of special interest are passive components in high
pressure :rystems and the rupture failure mode for pressure vessels
and flex hoses are considered in the failure mode effects analysis.
Action has also been initiated to require FMEA evaluation of hardware
Items whose structural failure due to aerodynamic stresses could have
a critical effect; e. g. , fine /farings, shields, external insulation,
external conduit and piping, exposed deployable/ separable hardware, and
access panels/doors. These hardware items will then be reviewed
to assure that all aspects associated with their design and test program
are given proper attention (structural/ aerodynamic analysis, testing;,
material selection, bonding, attachment methods, sealing, and inspection
techniques).
21
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Aerospace Safety Advisory }panel
Hazard Analysis Status
As was noted in the response on the status of Failure Mode Effects
Analysis (FMEA)/Critical Items Lists (CIL) activities on our projects,
we are presently reviewing and analyzing the FMEAs / CILs released
at the Preliminary Design Reviews on each of the MSFC Shuttle projects.
Our hazard analysis activity is proceeding in parallel with FMEA/CIL
activity. Additionally, each of our elements are making inputs into the
Element Interface Functional Analysis (EIFA) being developed by JSC
for;
Space Shuttle Main Engine/Orbiter
Solid Rocket Booster/External Tank-Orbiter
All of these activities are focused on providing early visability of hazards
to provide for minimizing hazards either through design approaches or
redundancy prior to the element Critical Design Reviews. At this timo,
we are still in the process of establishing the milestones for completion
of our analysis of the FMEA/CiL and the hazards list developed thus
far by our element contractors. However, these documents are the
subject of on-going technical and management reviews at Level III and
Level II toward assuring that all failure modes, etc. , are being covered.
Enclosure 2
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Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
7075-T6
Action Item: Provide Panel with relatior iip between the rejection of
7075-T6 material in the lunar module to the initially planned use of
this material on the ET intertank.
7075-T6 forgings and plate were rejected for use on the lunar module
because of susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking (SCC). The
threshold tensile stress for onset of SCC is approximately 7000 psi
for 7075-T6 stressed in the short transverse direction. This stress
level can easily be exceeded in forgings and in plate material. It is
nearly impossible to exceed the threshold stress in the short transverse•
direction in sheet material, hence the use of 7075-T6 sheet material
is acceptable, provided it can be shown that the intended use meets
the requirement of no short transverse tensile stresses exceeding
7000 psi.
The concern with the planned use of 7075-T6 by MMC had to do with
notch sensitivity, and not SCC. The MMC usage involved 7075-T6
sheet largely, which will be exposed to linuid hydrogen temperatures.
At L112 temperature the notch strength of 7075-T6 is inferior to both
2024-T7 and 7075-T73 hence the use of 7075-T6 sheet has been limited
to temperatures no colder than -200 o F. Any remaining 7075-T6 sheet
uses at >- 200 O F have been certified to have negligible short transverst-
tensile loading.
Enclosure 3
23
keroepace Safety Advisory Panel
Tnflon V-,1re Usage in LOX/GO'X Environment
The ET P, o,jec.t selection of Teflon (FEP) insulated wire was based
on extensive Satur n experience and testin ;;
 in identical environments.
These en vim nmento dif%ered drastically from the high pressure two
phase sysioni used oil
Our test c,xpe;Aencc on the .latitrn Program with this wire. insulation
may be sunimarixcd as follows:
a. No ignitiions could be induced in LOX cnvironnients in any
case tested.
b. Ignitions could be induced in GOX (05-75 p.,i) environments
only with 800 1/o electrical overloads. In canes whc,re ij;nition was
initiated, the wire and insulation self -extin t,ui.,hcd it the wall of
the test chanihcr and drip burn products ware yucriched by the WX
in the test chamber.
c. Using flight hardware connectors ; connector gins failed before
the wire could be overloaded to a point where; ignition could occur.
The current ET design uses 22 gage Tefloii (1 ,T"ll in, i;ulate-d wire
for the liquid level and loading sensors in the , LO.X ianks. This
wire capability is:
a. Fusion current - 60 amps
b. Recommended design capability - 15 amps
c. Normal ET usage - 0. 09 amps
d. Maximurn ET current (limited by :sensor fusing) - 1. 5 amps
Therefore, it is MSFC's conclusion that the flammability tcst-_ng
experience during the Saturn Program and specific to ,ts required
by NITF 8060. 1A will verify the acceptability of the currant design.
The lnost critical test of this :specification is electrical overload
on actual harnesses at worst case tenrper-atures and pressures.
Enclosure 4
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2This test will be performed when actual production harnesses are
available, which will not occur for sonic time.
MSFC recommends that this action be closed based on our com-
b	 pliance with NIIB 8060. IA.Should the harnes,,a overload test fail,
then corrective action will be implemented.
fl
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Aerospace Safety Advisory Pane!
Material Management System
The question as posed in the May 23 correspondence asked for the
specific management system being utilized that assures that stress
corrosion problems are under control. Our briefing to the Panel on
April 7 addressed our utilization of a materials specification and the
requirement for submission of Materials Usage Agreements to a
Materials Applications and Evaluation Board (MAEB) when a deviation
from the specification was being considered for implementation. The
MAEB is chaired by the Director, Materials & Processes Laboratory.
Regarding the visability that is conveyed across the program
elements on any approved deviations from the materials specification
information is being provided through two methods at the present time.
The requirement for MATCO Forms (Material Tracking and Control)
is being implemented on Shuttle Projects for transmittal to JSC/RI/SD
and daily exchanges of information are taking place between materials
and processes personnel throughout the NASA organizations. Additionally,
JSC will be placed on the distribution for the Material Usage Agreements
processed on MSFC Shuttle Projects. Visability across the program
elements and NASA Centers is further enhanced by the release of
SAF-ALERTS and ALERTS on material or material process problems
experienced during the development, testing, and production of hardware.
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Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Lightning - External Tank
Action:
Provide closeout documentation on the ET lightning protection imple-
n,entati.on.
Discussion:
a. Two nie.c.tings of the U0i1:di)g 'beam were held on April 21, 1975,
and May 20, 1975, to assess ET progress,
b. The assessment is now beii)(i directed to defininl; swept Stroke
li<<htning model which i;^ xe prcr:c nt rtivc of ill( , conditions ' T can expect
daving ascent. This at,t,r • oach is Imsed on:
(1) F"r will be pi-otecte(i on the launch pad by the KSC haciiit),
Pro,ecti.on System.
(2) The Shuttle Vehicle v. ill ► poi br> 1: S IP IWO ti,r• n ► !crh a thl!!lcic, r-
stor• nl, rai. ►1, ur- hail bccau.W of	 or Orbiter TPS condition.,,-t.
(3) E'T in-volvemcnt v.-ith lightning because of these constraints
will be at some mi. ►► fimml altitudQ and vehicle: velocity.
(9)	 Vehicle vc:loc AY at the n ► ini ►ru ►n altitude is a factor in
as., 'e,;sing the tank burn through potential whicl, is the pr i me concernill
	 lightning protec:tiun.
c. JSC and corlsultanis will develop swept stroke lightning model
on or about June 13, 1.975. .mother team meeting will be established
thereaft12r to discu:.s verification aspects.
For cuntingency purposes, MTUC will cont'nue the investigation
of suitable metallic paints for diverter strips and will perform tests
to determine burn through limits of the ET tank walls.
(7oncl us! on:
LT lightning protection design is currently predicated upon use of the
GO  pressurisation linc ana a lightning rod for swept stroke lightni, ► g
dispersion. It is anticipated that the current design will meet tile,
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2intent of the Level U lightning specification whon that specifica l ion Js
corrected to recognize swept stroke design critoria. Verification
of design perfurmanco will be accomplished flivough analyses and
emperical data.
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Potential Ice Damage to Orbiter TPS
A1SFC clods not have a test program to specifically define /establish the
effect of condensation forming on flight type interface structure and
subseque ►►tly running; down the tank and freezing, which may result in
damage to the Orbi t er TPS. IIowever, as a part to the ice/frost test,
using a 10-foot tank at EAFB, grater, fog, and mist will be applied to
the tan]: siclewall including simulated interfacc , structure under antici-
pated worst environn •jental conditions. Results of this tasting (quantitative
ice/frost characteristics) will he provided to the System Integration
Contractor for definiug; the Orbiter TPS tolm-uiicos for ir.e/frost debris.
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Allowable SSME Heat Exchanger Oxidizer Coil Leakage Rate
During the presentation on this subject the Safety Panel questioned t ie
allowable heat e:^changer oxidizer coil leakage rate of 1 X 10- 6cc helium/
second. It was stated that the present technology in leak detection permits
measurement of leakage at considerably lower rates. The Panel position
was correctly stated since leakage rates in the range of 1 X 10" 10cc
helium/second are detectable with mass spectrometers and halogen leak
detectors. However. the SSME allowable heat exchanger coil leakage
was not established based on measurement capabilities in a controlled
laboratory but rather the feasibility of measurement in a field operational
environment with a specified turnaround time. The minimum expected
leakage with welded joints was also considered. Our present plan is to
allow leakage of 1 X 10 -6 cc helium/second during component tests
and 1 X 10 -3 cc helium/second during the field operational leak test
inspection. The adequacy of this approach will be verified during the
engine development (DVS) test program and the allowable heat exchanger
leakage vAll be reassessed against our latest test .results.
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AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL
LIGHTNING — SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE
Action:
Provide closeout documentation on the SSME lightning protection.
Discussion:
a. Rocket-,dyne assessment of JSC 07636(Space Shuttle Lightning
Protection Criteria Document, dated September 11, 1973) was completed
and provided to MSFC ca April 23, 1975.
b. MSFC is in process of evaluating the Rocketdyne assessment to
determine the degree of change, if any, that MSFC will recommend be made
to the SSME design. The MSFC assessment is based on the following:
(1) On-Pad Protection: The SSME, as well as the entire Space
Shuttle Vehicle, will be protected on the launch pad by the KSC Facility
Protection System.
(2) Ascent Protection - Direct Strike: The SSME is in cones
of protection of the Orbiter stabilizer and SRB's on ascent; hence, a
direct strike (200 KA current) to the SSME on ascent and the re&ulting
direct effects (blast, burn, etc.) are ruled out. Tests by MDAC for
JSC have confirmed this SSME protective situation. (Reference McDonnell-
Douglas Corporation Report MDCA3155, "Final Report, Simulated Lightning
Test, Shuttle 0.03 Scale Model", October 25, 1974). In addition, the
heat shield is expected to divert the direct stroke around engine com-
partment. Thus, only the nozzle could be liable to direct effects
damage,
(3) Reentry Protection - Direct Strike: A direct strike to
the SSME on reentry (200 KA current) may be possible, but similar MDAC
tests are necessary to determine if the SSME may also be in a cone of
protection, ruling out this situation. Such a strike, however, would
not affect the mission since the SSME is inoperative on reentry. Only
minor damage, if any, would be sustained by the SSME to the nozzle since
the heat shield would divert the current from the nozzle around the engine
compartment,
(4) Protection - Indirect Effect: Indirect effects (induced
voltages and currents caused by electromagnetic fields) are based upon
field strengths provided by JSC. A change to add shielding to most SSME
electrical harnesses will provide complete SSME protection from indirect
effects based upon JSC provided data. Engine shutdown due to indirect
effects would thus be prevented on ascent.
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2(5) Current SSME Capabili : Current SSME design is adequate
if launch restrictions due to weather are imposed, and if the defined
maximum strike current and induced field levels are too conservative.
(6) Swept Stroke: The SSME is subject to swept stroke lightning
on ascent and reentry, but tests by Lightning Transients Research Corp.
(LTRI Report No. 563) indicate no damage to nozzle if 100 KA current stroke
is swept along by 90 mph air flow. JSC and consultants plan to develop
swept stroke lightning model in June on which further assessment can be
made.
(7) The SSME is protected by a shroud during ferry flights.
c. MSFC recommendation will be made to JSC (Shuttle Program Manager)
by June 20, 1975, upon completion of the MSFC evaluation.
Conclusion:
Current SSMC design appears to afford adequate protection if appropriate
launch and reentry constraints are imposed. Added shielding to harnesses
($lM) will protect from engine shutdown on ascent provided a direct strike
to SSME is ruled out as a possibility. Full implementation of protection
against direct strike during ascent is not considered warranted based on
test data.
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Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
Utilization of Teflon Balls in POGO Suppressor Unit
The analyses supporting the subject utilization (acting as a membrane
on the liquid surface) were covered with Dr. Mrazek in a separaf,e briefing.
The initial POGO sups ressor design effort did consider a flexible membrane
in lieu of Teflon balls. The Ftl/SD concept, located upstream of the low
pressure oxidizer pump, used a flexible membrane. Rocketdyne's
suppressor is located downstream of the pump and is exposed to higher
pressure differentials. A flexible membrane was considered but the
pressures and increased compliance to the system led to utilization of
the Teflon halls.
Concern for the difficulty in developing the hollow Teflon balls was
discussed and the possibility that the balls may have to be stainless
steel with Teflon coatings was covered. The emphasis will remain on
the use of Teflon due to its recognized LOX/GOX compatibility properties.
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